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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the link between economic development and penile length between 
1960 and 1985. It estimates an augmented Solow model utilizing the Mankiw-Romer-Weil 
121 country dataset. The size of male organ is found to have an inverse U-shaped 
relationship with the level of GDP in 1985. It can alone explain over 15% of the variation in 
GDP. The GDP maximizing size is around 13.5 centimetres, and a collapse in economic 
development is identified as the size of male organ exceeds 16 centimetres. Economic 
growth between 1960 and 1985 is negatively associated with the size of male organ, and it 
alone explains 20% of the variation in GDP growth. With due reservations it is also found 
to be more important determinant of GDP growth than country's political regime type. 
Controlling for male organ slows convergence and mitigates the negative effect of 
population growth on economic development slightly. Although all evidence is suggestive 
at this stage, the `male organ hypothesis' put forward here is robust to exhaustive set of 
controls and rests on surprisingly strong correlations. 
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1 Introduction
Economic growth has sparked intellectual endeavours for decades. The con-
vergence hypothesis put forward in Solow (1956), in particular, has received
considerable attention. It posits an inverse relationship between the level and
growth of GDP. As poor countries are scarce in capital but abundant in la-
bor, marginal products of investments are high. Injections of capital result in
higher growth rates in developing countries and convergence should ensue. Lit-
erature has established limited empirical support for the convergence hypothesis
(Mankiw et al., 1992; Barro, 1991). The inverse relationship is robust especially
after human capital has been controlled for. Regarding GDP growth in general,
Barro found evidence that government consumption and political instability
inhibit economic development. Focusing on the role of political institutions
Helliwell (1994) concluded that democracy does not seem to contribute to eco-
nomic growth but is associated with higher levels of GDP. In another strand of
literature Jones & Schneider (2006) show that IQ can explain a substantial part
of the cross-country differentials in GDPs. However, as the authors point out,
IQ is likely to be influenced by education, health and literacy, making it highly
endogenous.
The studies cited above are well established and generally achieve high pre-
dictive power. Yet as they concentrate on economic, social and political factors,
these and many related treatments largely abstain from biological and/or sexual
considerations. The aim of this paper is to fill this scholarly gap with the male
organ. Hence in contrast to much of the existing literature, economic develop-
ment is viewed from a perspective quite novel. The question is whether and
how strongly the average sizes of male organ are associated with GDPs between
1960 and 1985? It is argued here that the average size – the erect length, to be
precise – of male organ in population has a strong predictive power of economic
development during the period. The exact causality can only be speculated at
this point but the correlations are robust.
To facilitate comparison with earlier research, this study utilizes a widely-
used cross-country dataset originally published in Summers & Heston (1988)
and further augmented in Mankiw et al. (1992) [henceforth MRW]. In total
the dataset contains 121 countries of which a sub-sample of 76 observations
is utilized. Results in MRW form the baseline against which the findings in
this paper are contrasted. However, no attempt to augment the Solow model
beyond MRW has been made. In order to control for political conditions, Polity
IV data is utilized. This well-known score is used to assess whether the ‘male
organ hypothesis’ is robust to countries’ political regime type on autocracy–
democracy spectrum.
The contribution of this paper is to show that the level and growth of per
capita GDP between 1960 and 1985 is not invariant to the average size of male
organ in population. Indeed the ‘male organ hypothesis’ put forward here sug-
gests that penises carry economic significance. Quite remarkably, the statistical
endurance of the male organ is also found very formidable. However, the key
findings of this paper are as follows.
First, male organ is found to experience an inverted U-shaped relationship
with GDP in 1985. The GDP-maximizing length can be identified at around
13.5 centimetres. One striking result is the collapse in GDP after male organ
exceeds the length of 16 centimetres. Moreover, it is also noteworthy that
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countries with below 12 centimetre male organs are generally less developed.
Penile length alone can explain over 15% of the between-country variation in
1985 GDP. Startlingly the male organ coefficients are statistically significant at
the 1% level in all model specifications.
Second, the average growth rates from 1960 to 1985 are found to be nega-
tively correlated with the sizes of male organs: unit centimetre increase in its
physical dimension is found to reduce GDP growth by 5 to 7% between 1960 and
1985. Furthermore, quite remarkable is the finding that male organ alone can
explain 20% of the between-country variation in GDP growth rates between
1960 and 1985. Regarding the relative importance of political institutions in
shaping economic development, it seems that male organ is more strongly as-
sociated with GDP growth than country’s political regime type. Male organ
diminishes the negative effect of population growth on the level of GDP in 1985
compared to MRW. Moreover, controlling for penile length slightly slows the
rate of convergence between rich and poor countries. As intriguing as both of
these effects are, they are unarguably within the margins of error.
Only stylized explanations for these perplexing patterns can be brought up
at this point. One discussed below revolves around the proposed aggregate
‘self-esteem production function’ which could potentially explain the inverted
relation between GDP and penile length.
Taken at face value the findings suggest that the ‘male organ hypothesis’
put forward here is quite penetrating an argument. Yet for the best of author’s
knowledge, male organ has not been touched in the growth literature before.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and estimated
model. Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5
concludes. Tables, figures and data are in the Appendix.
2 Data and estimation
2.1 Data
The dataset originates from MRW, and includes income, investment, schooling
and population statistics from 1960 to 1985. It covers 121 countries but a sub-
sample of 76 from a total of 98 non-oil producing economies is used here. This
dataset is well-known and extensively used in the growth literature. Detailed
descriptions of the data and its limitations are provided in previous studies
(Mankiw et al., 1992; Summers & Heston, 1988; Barro, 1991).
Sample statistics are given in Table (1)1. As in MRW, GDPs are in per
capita terms. I/Y represents investments as a share of GDP and SCHOOL the
percentage of working-age population in secondary school. Both are averaged
over the period from 1960 to 1985.
Political data comes from the Polity IV Project, which scores countries on
scale −10, . . . ,+10 according to their regime type2. Authoritarian regimes
are assigned more negative, democratic more positive values. In estimation
POLITY2 score for 1980 is used. To alleviate potential endogeneity issues an
1The dataset used in this study is included in the Appendix. It is a subset of the original
MRW dataset extended with additional variables relevant to this study.
2See http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm for indicators and references
therein.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Mean and s.d. values for the sample of 98 non-oil
producing countries.
Variable Mean S.d.
GDP1960 2994 2862
GDP1985 5309 5277
I/Y 17.6 7.9
SCHOOL 5.3 3.4
ORGAN 14.5 1.9
POLITY1980 -0.1 7.7
Growth rates 1960–1985
GDP 3.9 1.8
Working age population 2.2 0.8
Notes: GDP is in per capita. I/Y and SCHOOL
are in percentages and averaged over the period.
ORGAN is in centimetres. Growth rates are in
percent per year.
earlier date would have been preferable. However, as many formerly colonial
countries became independent between 1960 and 1985, data was not available
for some observations on earlier years. As pointed out in Barro (1996) political
regime types interplay with economic development considerably. Endogeneity
may thus be severe. However, even given this reservation it is still interesting
to see whether the ‘male organ hypothesis’ is robust to countries’ position on
the autocracy–democracy axis.
In accordance with much of the growth literature, a region dummy for
African countries is included in the regressions. Here it refers to all countries
on the continent, not only on sub-Saharan Africa. The various reasons for in-
cluding African and other regional dummies have been extensively discussed in
the literature. However, here it is included as a robustness check as African
countries are characterized by above-average penile lengths but generally low
GDPs.
The data regarding the physical dimensions of male organs is openly avail-
able online and has been compiled [by an unknown party] from an extensive
number of sources3. Large part of the data has been collected by health au-
thorities but some observations are self-reported. Due to the sensitive nature
of the subject matter, self-reported data might be biased, supposedly upwards.
However, a moment of reflection with the global penile length distribution map
and anecdotal ‘Internet-sourced evidence’ reveals that the self-reported figures
are in-line with anticipated patterns. Still, measurement errors can not be ruled
out.
The physical dimension of male organ varies considerably across countries,
the average being 14.5 centimetres. For example, South Korea and Zaire [now
Dem. Rep. of the Congo] have average sizes of 9.66 and 17.93 centimetres,
3See http://www.everyoneweb.com/worldpenissize/ for the list of by-country penis sizes
and references therein.
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respectively. This unexpectedly high between-country variation is desirable, as
it entails smaller variance in the estimated coefficient. Currently the data does
not include length observations for all of the 98 non-oil producing countries, and
hence the subset is reduced to a sample of 76 countries.
In many respects male organ can be considered quite convenient a variable.
First, it represents a well defined and concrete object. Second, it is relatively
easy to measure – erect length is used. Third, it is largely free from cultural
connotations that might hound complex institutional variables, in particular.
Hence in many ways male organ stands in contrast to other, more contentious
variables such as indices of political institutions, IQ, social or economic indi-
cators each of which might be subject to biases and measurement errors of
multitude sorts.
2.2 Estimation
The paper uses Mankiw et al. (1992) as its starting point, and in each estimation
the corresponding figures from that study are provided. Hence in each table
Model (1) replicates MRW results up to parameter accuracy, and Model (2)
presents the same estimations with the 76 country sub-sample. This allows for
direct comparison of estimates and fosters transparency. Regressions are made
using OLS with the following functional form
lnGDPi = β0 + lnXiβ +ORGANiγ1 +ORGAN2i γ2 +Diδ + µi (1)
where Xi includes investment [I/GDP], working-age population [n+ g+ δ] and
human capital [SCHOOL] variables. Vector β contains coefficients and i = 1...N
denotes the number of the observation. Depending on the model, the explained
GDP variable can either represent the level in 1985 or the average growth in
between 1960 and 1985. Furthermore, in order to identify convergence patterns
GDP in 1960, the variable Y1960 is included in Xi in some specifications.
Following MRW, Xi also includes the advancement of technology g and de-
preciation rate δ. Their sum at 0.05 is assumed equal across countries. Together
with the average population growth n the former factors constitute an impor-
tant determinant of the Solow model: namely, the prediction that population
growth is inversely related to per capita GDP growth. ORGAN contains data
on male organ and enters the equations in linear or quadratic forms. Di con-
tains POLITY1980 and AFRICA variables. The former represents Polity IV
[POLITY2] score for 1980, and the latter the respective dummy variables.
As Equation (1) indicates, the estimated model here is the original MRW
Solow model with additional male organ, political regime type and Africa con-
trols. No structure or economic interpretation is given for male organs at this
point. Richer, potentially micro-founded models would clearly be needed to
fully account the peculiar role male organs have played in the course of eco-
nomic development. Moreover, present-day economic theory does not provide
much intuition in this respect. For these reasons even the a priori sign of the
male organ coefficient is an open question.
Unbiasedness of Equation (1) requires that ORGAN must not be correlated
with the error term µ in the regression model. In particular, GDP ought not
affect the size of male organ. For reasons stated below, this can not be ruled
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out entirely. As human anatomy evolves rather slowly, the genetic part of the
between-population variation in penile lengths should date back to pre-historic
times. Hence much of the variation does not result from the developments
in recent centuries, and can be considered exogenous to 20th century GDPs.
However, improved living standards have increased body height and hence, po-
tentially, male organ size. As is shown in Vogel (1994), average heights did
increase between 1750 and 1875 among European populations because of im-
provements in diets and increases in intakes of calories. However, this is not
sufficient condition for endogeneity as height and penile length might be unre-
lated. Indeed the evidence that dimensions of body parts and penile lengths
are correlated, is mixed. Siminoski & Bain (1993) show that height and penile
length are positively albeit weakly correlated. On the other hand, according to
Shah & Christopher (2002) shoe size and penile length are unrelated. Taking
the conservative stance that the physical dimension of male organ is related to
male body size, endogeneity might then result as higher GDPs increase statures
over time.
If standard of living and penile length covary positively, the latter’s coeffi-
cient would be biased upwards. Namely, richer countries should evidence larger
male organs because of higher GDPs. Hence in the regressions the male organ
coefficients are likely to represent upper-bound estimates. However, as penile
length is here found to be negatively correlated with GDP – especially growth –
the reverse causality should in fact make the proposed ‘male organ hypothesis’
stronger. In other words, in the absence of any welfare-induced increase in body
stature the inverse relationship between male organ and GDP would be further
accentuated. However, the between-population variation in the penile lengths
is so substantial that any reverse causation should most likely have only minor
detrimental effects on the results.
3 Results
3.1 GDP in 1985
The OLS estimates indicate that the size of male organ has a marked effect on
the 1985 per capita GDP. This can be seen in Model (3) in Tables (2) and (3)
which show how ORGAN affects the 1985 GDP. The latter, augmented model
has more controls, while the former represent the textbook case. Estimates
with both set of controls suggest that an inverse U-shaped relationship exists
between GDP and the physical dimension of male organ. Hence countries with
average-sized male organs tend to be developed, while those at the extremes of
the male organ spectrum are relatively poor. To put the figures in perspective
they imply that the GDP-maximizing penile length is roughly 13.5 centimetres.
All ORGAN coefficients are significant at least at the 5% level irrespective of
the controls.
Comparing the coefficients in the augmented model of Table (3) suggests
that the negative impact of population growth [n+g+δ] on GDP is lower when
ORGAN is controlled for. Without male organ 1% increase in population growth
decrease the 1985 GDP by 1.65%. However, with male organ this decrease
drops to 1.07%. Although this finding falls within the margin of error, it is still
noteworthy as it suggests that population growth rates and male organ sizes
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are interrelated. In fact it seems that population growth is slightly higher at
the extremes of the male organ spectrum. Furthermore, the negative effect of
population growth on 1985 GDP decreases with more controls.
The inclusion of male organ does not materially change the results with
respect to investment ratio [I/GDP] or human capital [SCHOOL]. However, as
can be seen from Model (4), political regime type [POLITY1980] does not seem
to alter the role of male organ. Quite interestingly it also suggests that from the
GDP perspective male organs dwarf political institutions in importance – yet
this result must be taken with reservations. Model (5) indicates that male organ
is significant even after controlling for Africa [AFRICA]. This is encouraging
since it suggests that the results are not driven by Africa’s high ORGAN/GDP.
Figure (1) plots the relationship between 1985 GDP and male organ. In this
OLS regression the only explanatory variable is ORGAN in the quadratic form.
It is noteworthy that the male organ can alone explain over 15% of the variation
in GDPs. The inverted U-shaped relationship also shows how the GDPs collapse
when the average penile length exceeds 16 centimetres. Most of these countries
are found in Africa and Latin America. However, at the lower-end a similar
pattern is found: the majority of countries with male organs smaller than 12
centimetres are relatively poor. These are often Asian countries.
In conclusion, the inverted U-shaped link between the 1985 GDP and male
organ seems robust. Interestingly it remains highly significant even with the
full set of controls.
3.2 GDP growth between 1960 and 1985
The effect of male organ on GDP growth between 1960 and 1985 is presented in
Tables (4) and (5). The former represents the textbook case, while the latter in-
clude the full set of controls. As can be seen from Model (3), it has a statistically
significant effect on the average GDP growth between 1960 and 1985. Without
controlling for human capital, every incremental centimetre in ORGAN reduces
GDP growth during the period by 7%. To illustrate the significance, if France
with its average size of 16.1 centimetres had male organs on par with United
Kingdom’s 13.9 centimetres, French GDP would have ceteris paribus expanded
by around 15% more between 1960 and 1985 – a significant welfare effect by
any standards. Comparison of Model (2) and (3) in Table (4) indicates that
male organ does not have material impact on other coefficients, and hence that
original MRW results are robust in this respect.
Model (4) implies that Africa decreases the negative coefficient of ORGAN
from -0.07 to -0.05. Although this shift is not statistically significant, it suggests
that part of male organ’s negative effect is due to Africa’s combination of poor
economic performance and large male organs. Yet interestingly it can only
explain away part of the male organ’s negative effect.
Table (5) shows how human capital [SCHOOL] and political regime type
[POLITY1980] affect the results. The effect of ORGAN is again significant.
However, more interesting is the pattern concerning convergence. As can be
seen, the inclusion of male organ affects the coefficient of GDP in 1960 [Y1960].
The difference of Y1960 coefficients between Model (2) and (3) falls within
the margins of error, but it is still possible that male organ could slow the
convergence slightly. Some of the interaction probably takes place through
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Africa. Comparison of the Y1960 coefficients in Model (4) and (5) hints to
this direction since with AFRICA the convergence quickens slightly.
Model (4) and (5) of Table (5) highlights an interesting finding of this paper,
namely that male organ seems to be more important than political regime as
a determinant of GDP growth. This result is robust to the full set of controls.
Striking as it sound, caution should be exercised when interpreting this result
– political regime type is likely to be a highly endogenous variable.
Figure (2) plots the ratio of per capita GDP between 1960 and 1985 against
the size of male organ. In this OLS regression the only explanatory variable is
ORGAN in the linear form, while the dependent variable is the ratio of GDP
between 1960 and 1985. The pattern suggests that male organ is negatively
associated with GDP growth. In fact the male organ alone can explain some
20% of the variation in GDP growth. This is quite startling finding, since a
priori the two variables could be considered unrelated.
In conclusion, these results show that male organ is significant in all specifi-
cations. It is especially noteworthy that it remains significant at the 10% level
even when political regime type and Africa is controlled for.
4 Discussion
Taken at face value, the results presented here suggest that the physical dimen-
sion of male organ is not invariant to economic development in non-oil producing
countries between 1960 and 1985. However, the exact channel through which
these penile-effects take place remains unclear. Few very speculative explana-
tions are discussed below.
First, could the size of male organ be non-linearly related to the value society
put on women and thus aggravate economic development? A brief observation
of the data suggests that gender equality is less established at the extremes
of the male organ distribution, namely in Asia and Africa. This would be
consistent with the finding that the the 1985 GDP and male organ experienced
an inverted U-shaped relationship. However, this does not reverberate well
with the result that GDP growth between 1960 and 1985 and male organ are
negatively associated. Ignoring these contradictions it is also sensible to ask
why penile length and gender equality would be even related in the first place?
Second, does male organ covary with unobserved country characteristics
which are particularly sensitive to economic development? For example, could
political stability or population growth explain the patterns? Although po-
litically stable countries mostly have penile lengths in the range of 13 to 16
centimetres, it is impossible to disentangle why dysfunctional regimes would be
located at the extremes of the male organ spectrum. Regarding demographics,
male organ does have a slightly non-linear relationship with population growth,
which could potentially explain the puzzling patterns. Yet as the regression
models explicitly include political controls and population growth, the explana-
tions given above seem unlikely.
Third, in an evidently Freudian line of thought the notion of self-esteem
might be at play. In particular, male organ size s and income y could be
considered factors in the aggregate ‘self-esteem production function’ f and hence
affect utility u. Assuming the following functional form and decreasing returns of
self-esteem, namely u = f(y+s) and f ′(·) > 0, f ′′(·) < 0, the ‘small male organ’
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countries would gain more utility by expanding their economy than the ‘large
male organ’ countries. Actually the latter populations would simply exploit
their nature-given, non-disposable groin-area endowments. Expressed a little
more formally and abusing the notation, evaluated at given penile lengths ss
and sl, dudy (s = ss) >
du
dy (s = sl). Here ss and sl represent average penile
lengths in ‘small male organ’ and ‘large male organ’ countries, respectively, and
y denotes the per capita income. Assuming similar labor productivities, the
equilibrium should evidence an inverse relationship between GDPs and penile
lengths, namely ys > yl. Labor and leisure vary accordingly. Hence the world
would be characterized by two kinds of countries. One group would constitute
of leisure-poor, high-GDP countries with small male organs; the other of leisure-
rich but low-GDP countries with large male organs. At a very stylized level – and
noting that the within-region male organ variation is substantial – the former
would correspond to Asia, the latter to Latin America and Africa, with Europe
somewhere in-between. However, this theoretizing is conspicuously masculine
and omits the role of women altogether. Nevertheless, it can elegantly account
for certain stylized empirical regularities and is hence noteworthy.
As is evident at this stage, these interpretations are very tentative. Their
plausibility can not be assessed with the current model and data. More rigorous
methods and richer data are needed.
5 Conclusions
This paper has identified and estimated the link between economic develop-
ment and the physical dimension of male organ in population. In particular,
it was shown that the relationship between per capita GDP in 1985 and penile
length evidenced an inverted U-shaped pattern. A strongly negative association
between GDP growth from 1960 to 1985 and male organ was also identified.
Somewhat surprisingly, male organ was a stronger determinant of economic
development than country’s political regime type at the Polity IV autocracy–
democracy spectrum. Encouragingly, the results were robust to Africa controls.
With minor exceptions the original coefficients in Mankiw et al. (1992) remained
largely unchanged, which evidently speaks to MRW’s robustness. To vaguely
explain these peculiar patterns, the role of self-esteem production was proposed.
In general the average size of male organ was found to possess strong pre-
dictive power on the issues pertaining to economic development. This paper’s
major contribution has been the identification of this perplexing link. Then,
taken with reservations the findings presented here bring a novel perspective to
the discussion surrounding economic development. Due to comparable dataset,
the results can also be reflected on the established studies of the field (Mankiw
et al., 1992; Barro, 1991; Helliwell, 1994).
However, these findings entail one major caveat as they can only establish
statistical correlations, not necessarily causalities. Hence to conclude that small
male organs have driven GDP growth since 1960 is premature, however strong
the correlation. Yet the results still suggest that if penile length is not the
culprit, then some interplaying unobserved country or population characteristics
could manifest itself in economic development. Be it as it may, any non-trivial
statistical correlation with explanatory power of 15 to 20% should be taken
seriously and warrants more elaborate research.
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Further research could refine the approach in many respects. First, male
organ could be given more elaborate economic structure. In the current formu-
lation it has no economic interpretation, and only reflects an ad hoc extension to
the model developed in MRW. Second, the ‘male organ hypothesis’ put forward
here could be tested with more recent data. Third, instrumental variables could
be implemented to truly assess the causality issue.
For obvious reasons the male organ narrative yields little in terms of feasible
policy recommendations. Beyond mass [im]migration, not much can be done
on the average size of male organ at the population level. Still, one practical
and serious implication stands out. Namely, these findings spell trouble for
countries with large male organs since they evidence both low levels and growth
rates of GDPs. In fact it would be interesting to analyze whether the patterns
laid out here have any predictive power in the post-1985 era – did countries
with little male organs continue their growth spur and vice versa? However,
omitting further policy discussion at this point is sensible given that the results
are evidently tentative.
Even with the reservations outlined above the ‘male organ hypothesis’ is
worth pursuing in future research. It clearly seems that the ‘private sector’
deserves more credit for economic development than is typically acknowledged.
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Appendix
Figure 1: GDP in 1985 and the size of male organ in 76 countries, ORGAN in
linear and quadratic form, R¯2=0.15
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Figure 2: GDP ratio between 1985 and 1960 and the size of male organ in 76
countries, ORGAN in linear form, R¯2=0.20
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Table 2: Textbook Solow Model
Dependent variable: log GDP per working-age person in
1985, non-oil countries
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
CONSTANT 5.42*** 6.79*** 0.34 -0.60
-1.58 -1.65 (3.30) (2.68)
ln(I/GDP) 1.42*** 1.52*** 1.47*** 1.17***
-0.14 -0.16 (0.16) (0.14)
ln(n+ g + δ) -1.98*** -1.57** -1.15. -0.94.
-0.56 -0.57 (0.58) (0.48)
ORGAN 1.14* 1.25**
(0.49) (0.15)
ORGAN sq. -0.04* -0.04**
(0.01) (0.40)
AFRICA -0.93***
(0.01)
R¯2 0.60 0.62 0.65 0.77
Observations 98 76 76 76
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance lev-
els in all regressions: *** 0.1%, ** 1%, * 5% and . 10%.
Model (1) replicates the estimates in MRW Table I. Model
(2) shows (1) with a sub-sample of 76 countries for which
ORGAN is available. As in MRW, g + δ is assumed 0.05.
Table 3: Augmented Solow Model
Dependent variable: log GDP per working-age person in 1985, non-oil
countries
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CONSTANT 6.84*** 7.43** -1.51 -1.41 -1.57
(1.17) (1.29) (2.42) (2.31) (2.22)
ln(I/GDP) 0.69*** 0.78*** 0.70*** 0.65*** 0.70***
(0.13) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
ln(n+ g + δ) -1.74*** -1.65*** -1.07* -0.91* -0.89*
(0.41) (0.45) (0.43) (0.42) (0.40)
ln(SCHOOL) 0.65*** 0.71*** 0.77*** 0.68*** 0.53***
(0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11)
ORGAN 1.55*** 1.54*** 1.51***
(0.36) (0.34) (0.33)
ORGAN sq. -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
POLITY1980 0.01* 0.01.
(0.008) (0.008)
AFRICA -0.40*
(0.15)
R¯2 0.78 0.77 0.81 0.84 0.85
Observations 98 76 76 75 75
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels in all regres-
sions: *** 0.1%, ** 1%, * 5% and . 10%. Model (1) replicates the
estimates in MRW Table II. Model (2) shows (1) with a sub-sample of 76
countries for which ORGAN is available. As in MRW, g + δ is assumed
0.05.
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Table 4: Convergence, Textbook Model
Dependent variable: log difference GDP per working-age
person in 1960–1985, non-oil countries
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
CONSTANT 1.91* 2.33* 2.99** 3.19***
(0.83) (1.00) (0.94) (0.92)
ln(Y1960) -0.14** -0.18** -0.14* -0.22**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
ln(I/GDP) 0.64*** 0.73*** 0.64*** 0.64***
(0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
ln(n+ g + δ) -0.30 -0.32 -0.32 -0.39
(0.30) (0.34) (0.31) (0.30)
ORGAN -0.07*** -0.05*
(0.02) (0.02)
AFRICA -0.25*
(0.11)
R¯2 0.40 0.40 0.49 0.52
Observations 98 76 76 76
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels
in all regressions: *** 0.1%, ** 1%, * 5% and . 10%. Model
(1) replicates the estimates in MRW Table IV. Model (2)
shows (1) with a sub-sample of 76 countries for which OR-
GAN is available. As in MRW, g + δ is assumed 0.05.
Table 5: Convergence, Augmented Model
Dependent variable: log difference GDP per working-age person in 1960–
1985, non-oil countries
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CONSTANT 3.02*** 3.37*** 3.68*** 3.13** 3.11**
(0.82) (0.94) (0.90) (0.94) (0.94)
ln(Y1960) -0.28*** -0.32*** -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.28***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
ln(I/GDP) 0.52*** 0.54*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.53***
(0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
ln(n+ g + δ) -0.50. -0.57. -0.52. -0.68* -0.69*
(0.28) (0.31) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30)
ln(SCHOOL) 0.23*** 0.31*** 0.25** 0.27*** 0.23**
(0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
ORGAN -0.05** -0.04* -0.03.
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
POLITY1980 -0.004 -0.004
(0.006) (0.006)
AFRICA -0.13
(0.11)
R¯2 0.48 0.51 0.56 0.57 0.58
Observations 98 76 76 75 75
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels in all regres-
sions: *** 0.1%, ** 1%, * 5% and . 10%. Model (1) replicates the
estimates in MRW Table V. Model (2) shows (1) with a sub-sample of 76
countries for which ORGAN is available. As in MRW, g + δ is assumed
0.05.
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Table 6: Data 1/2
GDP Work Male Polity
Number Country 1960 1985 pop. I/Y School organ 1980 Africa
1 Algeria 2485 4371 2.6 24.1 4.5 14.19 -9 1
2 Angola 1588 1171 2.1 5.8 1.8 15.73 -7 1
3 Benin 1116 1071 2.4 10.8 1.8 16.2 -7 1
4 Botswana 959 3671 3.2 28.3 2.9 6 1
5 Burkina Faso 529 857 0.9 12.7 0.4 15.89 -7 1
6 Burundi 755 663 1.7 5.1 0.4 -7 1
7 Cameroon 889 2190 2.1 12.8 3.4 16.67 -8 1
8 Central Africa 838 789 1.7 10.5 1.4 15.33 -7 1
9 Chad 908 462 1.9 6.9 0.4 15.39 0 1
10 Congo 1009 2624 2.4 28.8 3.8 17.33 -8 1
11 Egypt 907 2160 2.5 16.3 7 15.59 -6 1
12 Ethiopia 533 608 2.3 5.4 1.1 13.53 -7 1
15 Ghana 1009 727 2.3 9.1 4.7 17.31 6 1
17 Ivory Coast 1386 1704 4.3 12.4 2.3 -9 1
18 Kenya 944 1329 3.4 17.4 2.4 -6 1
20 Liberia 863 944 3 21.5 2.5 -7 1
21 Madagascar 1194 975 2.2 7.1 2.6 -6 1
22 Malawi 455 823 2.4 13.2 0.6 -9 1
23 Mali 737 710 2.2 7.3 1 -7 1
24 Mauritania 777 1038 2.2 25.6 1 -7 1
25 Mauritius 1973 2967 2.6 17.1 7.3 9 1
26 Morocco 1030 2348 2.5 8.3 3.6 15.03 -8 1
27 Mozambique 1420 1035 2.7 6.1 0.7 -8 1
28 Niger 539 841 2.6 10.3 0.5 -7 1
29 Nigeria 1055 1186 2.4 12 2.3 15.5 7 1
30 Rwanda 460 696 2.8 7.9 0.4 -7 1
31 Senegal 1392 1450 2.3 9.6 1.7 15.89 -2 1
32 Sierra Leone 511 805 1.6 10.9 1.7 -7 1
33 Somalia 901 657 3.1 13.8 1.1 14.2 -7 1
34 South Africa 4768 7064 2.3 21.6 3 15.29 4 1
35 Sudan 1254 1038 2.6 13.2 2 16.47 -7 1
37 Tanzania 383 710 2.9 18 0.5 -6 1
38 Togo 777 978 2.5 15.5 2.9 -7 1
39 Tunisia 1623 3661 2.4 13.8 4.3 15.01 -9 1
40 Uganda 601 667 3.1 4.1 1.1 3 1
41 Zaire 594 412 2.4 6.5 3.6 17.93 -9 1
42 Zambia 1410 1217 2.7 31.7 2.4 15.78 -9 1
43 Zimbabwe 1187 2107 2.8 21.1 4.4 15.68 4 1
46 Bangladesh 846 1221 2.6 6.8 3.2 11.2 -4 0
47 Burma 517 1031 1.7 11.4 3.5 10.7 -8 0
48 Hong Kong 3085 13372 3 19.9 7.2 11.19 0
49 India 978 1339 2.4 16.8 5.1 10.24 8 0
52 Israel 4802 10450 2.8 28.5 9.5 14.38 9 0
53 Japan 3493 13893 1.2 36 10.9 10.92 10 0
54 Jordan 2183 4312 2.7 17.6 10.8 -10 0
55 South Korea 1285 4775 2.7 22.3 10.2 9.66 -8 0
57 Malaysia 2154 5788 3.2 23.2 7.3 11.49 4 0
58 Nepal 833 974 2 5.9 2.3 -9 0
60 Pakistan 1077 2175 3 12.2 3 12.2 -7 0
Notes: Number denotes reference to MRW data. GDP is in per capita. I/Y and school are in
percentages and averaged over the period. Working age population growth rates are in percent
per year. Male organ size in centimetres.
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Table 7: Data 2/2
GDP Work Male Polity
Number Country 1960 1985 pop. I/Y School organ 1980 Africa
61 Philippines 1668 2430 3 14.9 10.6 10.85 -9 0
63 Singapore 2793 14678 2.6 32.2 9 11.53 -2 0
64 Sri Lanka 1794 2482 2.4 14.8 8.3 10.89 6 0
65 Syrian Arab Rep. 2382 6042 3 15.9 8.8 -9 0
67 Thailand 1308 3220 3.1 18 4.4 10.16 2 0
70 Austria 5939 13327 0.4 23.4 8 14.16 10 0
71 Belgium 6789 14290 0.5 23.4 9.3 15.85 10 0
73 Denmark 8551 16491 0.6 26.6 10.7 15.29 10 0
74 Finland 6527 13779 0.7 36.9 11.5 13.77 10 0
75 France 7215 15027 1 26.2 8.9 16.01 8 0
76 Germany F. Rep. 7695 15297 0.5 28.5 8.4 14.48 10 0
77 Greece 2257 6868 0.7 29.3 7.9 14.73 8 0
79 Ireland 4411 8675 1.1 25.9 11.4 12.78 10 0
80 Italy 4913 11082 0.6 24.9 7.1 15.74 10 0
83 Netherlands 7689 13177 1.4 25.8 10.7 15.87 10 0
84 Norway 7938 19723 0.7 29.1 10 14.34 10 0
85 Portugal 2272 5827 0.6 22.5 5.8 13.19 9 0
86 Spain 3766 9903 1 17.7 8 13.85 9 0
87 Sweden 7802 15237 0.4 24.5 7.9 14.8 10 0
88 Switzerland 10308 15881 0.8 29.7 4.8 14.35 10 0
89 Turkey 2274 4444 2.5 20.2 5.5 14.11 -5 0
90 UK 7634 13331 0.3 18.4 8.9 13.97 10 0
92 Canada 10286 17935 2 23.3 10.6 13.92 10 0
93 Costa Rica 3360 4492 3.5 14.7 7 15.01 10 0
94 Dominican Rep. 1939 3308 2.9 17.1 5.8 15.99 6 0
95 El Salvador 2042 1997 3.3 8 3.9 14.88 -2 0
96 Guatemala 2481 3034 3.1 8.8 2.4 15.67 -5 0
97 Haiti 1096 1237 1.3 7.1 1.9 16.01 -9 0
98 Honduras 1430 1822 3.1 13.8 3.7 15 1 0
99 Jamaica 2726 3080 1.6 20.6 11.2 16.3 10 0
100 Mexico 4229 7380 3.3 19.5 6.6 15.1 -3 0
101 Nicaragua 3195 3978 3.3 14.5 5.8 15.26 0 0
102 Panama 2423 5021 3 26.1 11.6 16.27 -6 0
103 Trinidad & Tob. 9253 11285 1.9 20.4 8.8 8 0
104 US 12362 18988 1.5 21.1 11.9 12.9 10 0
105 Argentina 4852 5533 1.5 25.3 5 14.88 -9 0
106 Bolivia 1618 2055 2.4 13.3 4.9 16.51 -7 0
107 Brazil 1842 5563 2.9 23.2 4.7 16.1 -4 0
108 Chile 5189 5533 2.3 29.7 7.7 14.59 -7 0
109 Colombia 2672 4405 3 18 6.1 17.03 8 0
110 Ecuador 2198 4504 2.8 24.4 7.2 17.77 9 0
112 Paraguay 1951 3914 2.7 11.7 4.4 15.53 -8 0
113 Peru 3310 3775 2.9 12 8 16.03 7 0
115 Uruguay 5119 5495 0.6 11.8 7 15.14 -7 0
116 Venezuela 10367 6336 3.8 11.4 7 17.03 9 0
117 Australia 8440 13409 2 31.5 9.8 13.31 10 0
119 Indonesia 879 2159 1.9 13.9 4.1 11.67 -7 0
120 New Zealand 9523 12308 1.7 22.5 11.9 13.99 10 0
121 Papua N. G. 1781 2544 2.1 16.2 1.5 4 0
Notes: Number denotes reference to MRW data. GDP is in per capita. I/Y and school are in
percentages and averaged over the period. Working age population growth rates are in percent per
year. Male organ size in centimetres.
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